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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1996).
ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

Did the trial court commit reversible error by failing to remove three

prospective jurors for cause, when an impartial jury was empaneled and no prejudice
resulted?
Standard of review: A trial court's determination of whether to excuse a
prospective juror for cause should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion and a
showing of actual prejudice. State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, 24 P.3d 948.
II.

Was there sufficient evidence presented at trial to support the jury's verdict?

Standard of review: Reversal of a jury verdict for insufficiency of the evidence is
proper "only when, after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a
light most favorable to the verdict, [the appellate court finds] that the evidence to support
the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the
verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." State v. Silva? 2000 UT App 292, 13 P.3d 604.
A party seeking reversal of a jury verdict on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence
must "marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the
evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v.
Boyd, 2001 UT 30,112, 25 P.3d 985.
DETERMINATIVE RULES OR STATUTES
Rule 47 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Addendum A.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff/appellant Geraldine K. Harding ("Harding") filed this medical malpractice

action on or about December 10, 1997, alleging defendant/appellee Carl T. Bell
("Dr. Bell"), a physician specializing in family medicine, failed to diagnose and treat her
coronary artery disease ("CAD") and timely refer her to a cardiologist. Harding claims
that earlier diagnosis of her CAD would have prevented a heart attack she suffered on
January 26, 1997.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
A six-day jury trial was held on March 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, and 15, 2000, before the

Honorable Fred A. Howard. The jury returned a special verdict determining that Harding
was 55 percent negligent and Dr. Bell was 45 percent negligent.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
When reviewing a jury verdict, this court must "examine the evidence and all

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict.35 State v.
Krager, 2000 UT 60, 1112, 6 P.3d 1116. Dr. Bell recites the facts accordingly.1
1.

On or about January 4, 1997, Harding, who was then 49-years old,

experienced severe chest pain, left arm numbness, sudden nausea, dizziness, profuse
sweating and severe sternal pressure, while at a truck stop with her husband in Salt Lake
City, Utah. (R. at 1414 pp. 71-76.)

1

Dr. Bell objects to Harding's Statement of Facts for failure to recite the facts "in
a light most favorable" to the jury verdict, as is Harding's burden. Instead, Harding reargues her theory of the case. "This approach is inappropriate." Beesley v. Harris. 883
P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994).
2

2.

Harding's symptoms abated after about 30 minutes, except her left shoulder

and arm stayed numb for about an hour. (R. at 1414 p. 76.)
3.

Harding described the chest pain and symptoms she experienced on

January 4, 1997, at the truck stop to her mother and best friend, who were concerned and
prompted Harding to seek medical care. (R. at 1414 pp. 77-78.)
4.

On or about January 6, 1997, Harding called Dr. Carl T. Bell's office and

scheduled an appointment for January 13, 1997. (R. at 1414 pp. 78-79.)
5.

At the January 13, 1997, office visit, Harding informed Dr. Bell of her

January 4, 1997, chest pain and symptoms, and stated that she had been without chest
pain or other symptoms since that time. (R. at 1414 p. 83; R. at 1422 Def.'s Ex. A p. 7.)
6.

During this January 13, 1997, exam, Dr. Bell performed an in-office EKG,

which was interpreted as normal by Dr. Bell. The EKG was "over-read53 by Dr. Von
Welch, a board-certified internist, who confirmed that the EKG was normal. (R. at 1414
pp. 84-86; R. at 1413 p. 43; R. at 1422 Def.'s Ex. A p. 14.)
7.

Also on January 13, 1997, Dr. Bell had blood drawn and a CPK test

performed to determine whether cardiac enzymes indicative of heart muscle damage were
present. Laboratory tests confirmed that Harding's CPK level was normal. (R. at 1413
p. 43; R. at 1422 Def.'s Ex. A. pp. 9-10.)
8.

During the January 13th office visit, Dr. Bell also ordered an exercise

treadmill test ("ETT"), to be performed at American Fork Hospital, and Dr. Bell's office
scheduled Harding's ETT for January 22, 1997. (R. at 1414 pp. 86-87.)
9.

The ETT was performed on January 22, 1997, at American Fork Hospital

by an ETT technician, with Dr. Bell present. (R. at 1414 pp. 90-93.)
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10.

The ETT was initially over-read within 24-hours of administration by an

internal medicine physician at American Fork Hospital, Dr. Marian Hansen, who
interpreted it as "suggesting ischemia." Dr. Hansen did not recommend that any
follow-up testing be done or medical care provided on an urgent basis. (R. at 1422 Def.'s
Ex. A p. 67.)
11.

Dr. Bell accordingly referred Harding to Dr. Ronald Asay, a cardiologist

practicing in Provo, Utah, and scheduled an appointment for Harding with Dr. Asay on
February 5, 1997. (R. at 1414 pp. 96-98.)
12.

On January 24 and 25, 1997, Harding had recurrent chest pain, along with

malaise, tiredness and exertional discomfort. (R. at 1415 pp. 67-68, 81; R. at 1422 Def.'s
Ex. A. p. 114.)
13.

Despite the fact that Harding knew of potential heart problems and had an

appointment to be examined by a cardiologist, she sought no medical treatment for these
symptoms. She did not go to an emergency room, call Dr. Bell or seek any other medical
care on either of those two days. (R. at 1414 pp. 66-68, 75-78, 121; R. at 1415 pp. 6768; R. at 1422 Def.'s Ex. A. p. 114.)
14.

Dr. Kim Bateman, a board-certified family practice physician, testified at

trial that if Harding had sought medical attention on January 24th or 25 th for her chest
pain and symptoms, she would have been admitted to the hospital where an angioplasty
would ultimately have been performed, her CAD discovered and imminent heart attack
prevented. (R. at 1416 pp. 26-27, 64.) Dr. Bateman also testified that Dr. Bell's
treatment met the medical standard of care.
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15.

On January 26, 1997, Harding experienced severe chest pain while cleaning

horse stalls. She was taken to the American Fork Emergency Department by her husband,
and shortly thereafter was transferred via ambulance to Utah Valley Regional Medical
Center. (R. at 1414 p. 100-102; R. at 1422 Def.5s Ex. A p. 17-19, 34-35.)
16.

An angiogram performed the following morning, January 27, 1997,

disclosed Harding's CAD. That same day a coronary angioplasty was successfully
performed by Dr. Douglas R. Smith. (R. at 1415 p. 64; R. at 1422 Def.'s Ex. A pp. 2023, 34-35.)
17.

Harding was discharged from Utah Valley Regional Medical Center three

days later and has returned to full normal activity. (R. at 1414 pp. 108; R. at 1422 Def.'s
Ex. A p. 54, 56, 61; R. at 1415 pp. 72-73.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court's refusal to grant Harding's requested "for-cause" challenges

provides no basis for reversal of the jury verdict. The trial court appropriately exercised its
discretion in determining that the potential jurors were qualified. Harding used her
peremptory challenges to strike these same three jurors, and she cannot demonstrate that
the jurors who heard the case were biased. Thus, even if the three potential jurors should
have been dismissed for cause, plaintiff cannot demonstrate actual prejudice as required for
reversal.
II.

Harding has made no attempt to marshal the evidence supporting the trial

court's decision, and for this reason alone this court need not consider Harding's challenge
to the sufficiency of the findings. Additionally, there is more than sufficient evidence to
support the jury verdict allocating 45 percent of fault to Dr. Bell and 55 percent of fault to

5

Harding. This verdict is well within the range of possible outcomes supported by the
evidence presented, especially when viewed in the light most favorable to Dr. Bell. This
court must accordingly defer to the jury's assessment of liability and affirm.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURTS REFUSAL TO GRANT HARDING'S
REQUESTED FOR-CAUSE CHALLENGES PROVIDES N O
BASIS FOR REVERSAL.
A trial court's determination of whether to excuse a prospective juror for cause
should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, 1125,
24 P. 3d 948. Utah appellate courts are constrained to review such decisions with
deference because of the trial judge's "advantaged position in determining which persons
would be fair and impartial jurors." Id. at 1125.
Rule 47 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures provides that challenges for cause
are appropriate when it is demonstrated:
(6) That a state of mind exists on the part of the
juror with reference to the cause, or to either
party, which will prevent: him from acting
impartially and without prejudice to the
substantial rights of the party challenging; but
no person shall be disqualified as a juror by
reason of having formed or expressed an opinion
upon the matter or cause to be submitted to
such jury founded upon public rumor,
statement in public journals or common
notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court
that the juror can and will, notwithstanding such
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the
matter to be submitted to him.
Utah R. Civ. P. 47(f) (emphasis added).

6

When a juror makes comments on voir dire that facially raises a question of the
juror's partiality or prejudice, an abuse of discretion occurs "unless the challenged juror is
removed by the court or unless the court or counsel investigates and finds the inference
rebutted." Wach? 2001 UT 35, K25 (emphasis added). To rebut an inference of partiality,
the trial court "must adequately probe [the] juror's potential bias," and receive, through its
questioning, sufficient evidence that the juror will act impartially. State v. Boyatt, 854
P.2d 550, 551 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993). Rebuttal is
accomplished by showing that a juror would not "close the mind against the testimony
that may be offered in opposition.35 Wach, 2001 UT 35,1127. If, after investigation into
the juror's state of mind, the trial court is satisfied that the juror can act impartially, the
trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to remove the prospective juror for
cause. See Id. at 1129.
A.

HARDING CAN DEMONSTRATE NO ACTUAL BIAS.

Harding seeks reversal of the jury verdict in this case on the basis that the trial
court erred in denying her challenges for cause to potential Jurors Nos. 7, 11 & 12. A
careful review of voir dire and the follow-up investigation demonstrates no actual bias and
further that there was sufficient evidence that each juror would act impartially.
Potential Juror No. 7
Harding contends the following facts elicited from potential Juror No. 7 during
voir dire demonstrate bias: Potential Juror No. 7 lived in American Fork, took her
daughter to dance lessons at Dr. Bell's home taught by Dr. Bell's daughter, and knew
Dr. Bell's wife and children through the local elementary school. (Aplt. Br. p. 7.)
Harding fails to point out that potential Juror No. 7 also stated to the court that she did
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not know Dr. Bell, (R. at 1423), and that her acquaintance with Dr. Bell's daughter and
wife were "brief.33 (R. at 1411, pp. 4-15; R. at 1423.) These facts do not demonstrate
potential Juror No. 7 was partial. They are instead exactly the type of contact jurors in
small Utah towns commonly have with parties at trial.
Nevertheless, even if voir dire had indicated bias, the trial court properly passed
potential Juror No. 7 for cause because, after further questioning, it was assured of her
impartiality. Harding takes issue with potential Juror No. 7 because she stated on voir
dire:
Q:

[The Court] Have you developed a social or friendship relationship
with [Dr. Bell's family]?

A:

[Potential Juror No. 7] No, just know who they are.

Q:

In the event you were selected to serve as a juror, would that cause you to
feel uncomfortable in any way in rendering some decisions?

A:

I don't believe so. I don't think I could guarantee that.

(R. at 1411 pp. 4-5.)
Harding fails to mention, however, that potential Juror No. 7 was questioned in
chambers after this statement was made and the following investigation occurred:
Q:

[Mr. Ferguson] Not knowing how the case is going to turn
out or how you would feel about it, whether you vote for the
Plaintiff or the Defendant, would your relationship with Dr.
Bell's family inhibit you in any way from making what you
believe to be a fair determination of the case?

A:

[Potential Juror No. 7] No, I don't believe it would inhibit
me.

(R. at 1411 pp. 8-9.)
The trial court further probed into potential Juror No. 7's potential biases regarding
lawyers and physicians:
8

Q:

[The Court] But you do not have such sympathies [for
physicians].

A:

[Potential Juror No. 7] I don't believe I do.

Q:

You don't have a sympathy for either [the doctor or lawyers]
then?

A:

I don't think I do.

Q:

Do you have a sympathy for physicians.

A:

I don't believe I do. I think I could be just as loyal to either one.

(R. at 1411 p. 12.)
Given this testimony, it was well within the trial judge's discretion to determine
potential Juror No. 7 could serve impartially and without prejudice and to decline to
disqualify her for cause as a juror.
Potential Juror No. 11
Potential Juror No. ll's connection with Dr. Bell likewise raises no concerns of bias
or impartiality. Harding challenges potential Juror No. 11 because she was a second
cousin to one of Dr. Bell's expert witnesses, Dr. Kim Bateman, and who stated she was
close to Dr. Bateman's mother. (Aplt. Br. pp. 5-6; R. at 1411 pp. 16-17.) These facts do
not demonstrate that potential Juror No. 11 would be prevented from acting impartially
or without prejudice.2

2

Apparently Harding assumes that these facts would make potential Juror No. 11
biased in favor of Dr. Bateman. Common experience, however, allows us to assume that
many family members exercise heightened caution to be neutral and objective when
evaluating testimony of a relative. And, if potential Juror No. ll's familial relationship
were indicative of bias, it is just as likely to operate against Dr. Batemen, as it is in favor of
Dr. Bateman. The real issue is not the relationship per se, but the prospective juror's
9

Even if these facts were indicative of possible bias, potential Juror No. 11
repeatedly assured the trial court that she would be impartial:
Q:

[The Court] If he were called to testify would that pose a
problem for you? If you were to serve as a juror would you
tend to favor his testimony by virtue of your relationship?

A:

[Potential Juror No. 11] I don't think so.

Q:

Do you think you could be impartial?

A:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q:

. . . If you were to tend to discredit his testimony and yet you
had to see him in the future because of your relationship, do
you think that would make you uncomfortable?

A:

No.

Q:

Do you think, irrespective of your family relationship of being a cousin, that
you could treat his testimony fairly and impartially.

A:

I think so, because I really don't see him; it's his mother.

(R. at 1411 pp.18-19.)
Further,
Q:

[The Court] . . . If you were to serve as a juror do you think you could
serve in this capacity fairly and impartially, knowing that you're a cousin,
you have a relationship? Or do you think it would simply cause you to
favor him if some other doctor came in taking a different opinion on the
subject that Dr. Bateman was testifying on? You see? Would that tend to
color the way in which you viewed their testimony by virtue of their
relationship?

A:

[Potential Juror No. 11] I don't think so by virtue of my relationship,
because I'm just not that close to Kim. I don't know him as a person; I just
know him as a name on a family list.

attitude.
10

(R. at 1411 pp. 22-23.) Following this colloquy, Harding's counsel challenged potential
Juror No. 11 for cause and the trial court declined, stating cTm pursuaded she's qualified
and Fll pass her." (R. at 1411 p. 28.) Given that potential Juror No. 11 repeatedly told
the court in chambers that she did not know the witness except as a "name on a family
list," and that she would be fair, objective and would not be biased in favor of
Dr. Bateman's testimony, it was well within the trial court's discretion to decline to excuse
her for cause.
Rather than demonstrate the requisite "actual bias" or abuse of discretion, Harding
contends that the plurality opinion in State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 951, is
cc

hauntingly similar" to the present case and requires this court to find the trial court

abused its discretion in passing Jurors Nos. 11 and 7 for cause. (Aplt. Br. p. 22.)
Harding claims that because the trial court abused its discretion in Saunders, the trial court
must have abused its discretion in this case. (Aplt. Br. pp. 22-25.) Even a cursory
reading of Saunders demonstrates it is factually dissimilar and has no application here. In
Saunders, the prospective juror at issue stated she was "uncomfortable" deciding an
attempted rape case because of her personal history with being a victim of incest and
molestation. Id. at 964. The Utah Supreme Court determined that this juror should have
been removed for cause because her statement that she would be '"uncomfortable3 in
deciding [the] case begs further investigation that the trial judge should have allowed." Id.
at 1150. Her comments and history of recent sexual abuse made clear she could not
deliberate in a case for attempted rape and sexual abuse of a child without being "affected
by a consideration extraneous to the facts and law of [the] case." Id. at 964. The
concerns in Saunders are not present in this case: All potential areas of discomfort
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expressed by potential jurors Nos. 11 and 7 were followed up on by the trial judge, and
the judge determined that their deliberations would not be affected by facts extraneous to
the case.
Potential Juror No. 12
Harding takes issue with potential Juror No. 12 because one of her "best friends
has been a patient of Dr. Bell33 and this friend liked Dr. Bell. (Aplt. Br. p. 8.) Despite
these allegations, potential Juror No. 12 had no personal relationship with Dr. Bell and
there is no indication of bias or impartiality on the part of Juror No. 12. Juror No. 12
was interviewed in chambers, where the following colloquy took place:
Q:

[Mr. Vilos]: Would you be somewhat uneasy in rendering a decision
against your best friend3s doctor?

A:

[Potential Juror No. 12] No.

(R. at 1411 pp. 32-33.) Following this in-chambers investigation, the court declined
Harding's challenge for cause, satisfied that potential Juror No. 12 would listen to the
evidence and decide the case based upon the evidence presented. (R. at 1411 pp. 35-38.)
Given potential Juror No. 12's statement that her friend's association with Dr. Bell would
not cause her to favor Dr. Bell or cause her difficulty in finding liability against Dr. Bell,
this ruling was within the trial court's broad discretion.
In sum, based on the totality of the exchanges between the judge, counsel and
potential jurors, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
Harding's request that potential Jurors Nos. 7, 11 & 12 be removed for cause. To the
contrary, the Court aggressively questioned each juror in an attempt to illicit any bias, had
an opportunity to view each juror's demeanor, assess her or his credibility, and satisfied
itself as to the juror's impartiality. Indeed, in the seven hours spent examining the
12

prospective jurors in this case, the court eliminated many potential jurors for cause,
demonstrating it had no hesitation to do so if it had any misgivings about a juror's ability
to sit.3
B.

HARDING FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE ACTUAL PREJUDICE.

Even if Harding could demonstrate that potential Jurors Nos. 7,11 & 12 were in
fact biased and that they should have been stricken by the trial court for cause, it would
nevertheless be error to reverse the jury verdict on this basis because Harding cannot
demonstrate "actual prejudice" resulted. To obtain a new trial for failure to dismiss a
prospective juror for cause, cca party must prove that the trial court's failure to dismiss a
juror for cause resulted in actual prejudice to the party." State v. Russell, 917 E2d 557,
560 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996); accord State v. Menzies.
889 P.2d 393, 400 (Utah 1994), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 1115 (1995). Mere use of a
peremptory challenge is alone insufficient. To demonstrate prejudice, Harding must:
show that as a result of the loss of his peremptory challenge
[she] was not able to remove another subsequently summoned
juror who ultimately sat on the jury, and who was "partial or
incompetent."

3

Harding suggests that the trial court should have excused for cause each of these
potential jurors simply to err on the side of safety, contending cc[t]here were plenty of
other jurors in the pool to fill out the required eight jurors." (Aplt. Br. p. 22.)
Notwithstanding the fact that the existence of a large jury pool is not the standard for
excusing potential jurors for cause, Harding's contention is not supported in the record.
When Harding's counsel raised this issue during the in-chambers investigation of potential
jurors, the trial judge stated in response: "Let me backup and say, right now we're just
about fifty percent. We're striking a lot of people. We do not have a large amount."
(R. at 1411 p. 37).
13

Wach, 2001 UT 35,1135 (quoting State v. Baker. 935 P.2d 503, 506 (Utah 1997)). This
determination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Woolley, 810 P. 2d
440, 442 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).
Harding fails to demonstrate that any of the jurors who actually sat were "partial or
incompetent," as is her burden on appeal. Instead, Harding circumvents the relevant
inquiry and merely concludes that cc[o]bviously, using all three peremptories to strike
jurors who should have been stricken for bias was prejudicial to plaintiffs.55 (Aplt. Br.
p. 25.) This unsupported declaration is not demonstrative of either partiality or
competence, and falls far short of demonstrating actual prejudice. Indeed, given that the
jury apportioned a high percentage of fault to Dr. Bell, any argument that the jury was
biased in his favor is facially untenable. All Harding can show is she used a peremptory
challenge to remove a panel member whom she claims should have been stricken for cause.
This does not amount to prejudice sufficient to reverse a jury verdict under Utah law. See
State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393, 400 (Utah 1994), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 115 (1995).
Harding's only contention of prejudice is that "[h]ad the three challenged jurors
been appropriately stricken for cause, plaintiffs peremptory strikes would have made this
panel more fair." (Aplt. Br. p. 28.) It is, foremost, rank speculation for Harding to opine
that she could have empaneled a "more fair" jury if she had the three peremptory
challenges at issue. More importantly, Utah law only requires an impartial jury, which
Harding received in this case. Utah law does not require reversal of a jury trial merely
because Harding now perceives she could have constructed a jury more favorable to her
position.
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Significantly, to support her claim of prejudice, Harding ignores current Utah law
and relies on overturned precedent. Harding represents to this court that "[fjailure to
excuse a juror for cause in a medical malpractice case, when cause exists, which forces the
plaintiff to use a peremptory challenge to strike that juror, is reversible error,35 citing
Tenkins v. Parrish. 627 P.2d 533 (Utah 1981). (Aplt. Br. p. 22.) This portion ofTenkins
has, however, been expressly overruled by State v. Menzies. See State v. Wach, 2001 UT
35,1124 n.2 (specifically stating Menzies overturned lenkins). The rule that guides us is, as
stated above, that "to obtain reversal a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz^, show
that a member of the jury was partial or incompetent." Menzies, 889 P.2d at 400.
Harding fails to do this.
POINT II.
THE JURY VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE AND SHOULD NOT BE REVERSED.
Harding briefs the denial of her Motions for JNOV and for New Trial as separate
issues. (Aplt. Br. pp. 29 & 45.) However, because her arguments are essentially the same
for each issue, they are treated together herein. The gravamen of Harding's contention is
that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of Harding's comparative
negligence.
An insufficiency-of-the-evidence based challenge to a denial of
either [a JNOV or new trial] motion is governed by one
standard of review: we reverse only if, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the party who prevailed, we
conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the
verdict.
Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988). Review of the jury's verdict places cca
difficult burden on the challenging party." Selvage v. T.T. Tohnson & Assoc, 910 P.2d
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1252, 1257 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the
verdict and, if the evidence supports the verdict, it must be affirmed. Id.; accord Steenblik
v. Lichfield. 906 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995).
A.

HARDING FAILS TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.

Because Harding's challenge to the denial of her motions attacks the sufficiency of
the evidence, it is Harding's burden on appeal "to marshal the evidence in support of the
verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict." State v Boyd. 2001 UT 30, H2, 25 P.3d 985; Valcarce v.
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998). Harding fails to demonstrate that the
evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. For this reason alone, this Court
can affirm the jury verdict without considering Harding's challenge to the sufficiency of
the findings. Tanner v. Carter. 2001 UT 18,1f33, 20 P.3d 332; Scharfv. BMG Corp.,
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
This is a medical malpractice action and the defense was substantially mounted
through expert witnesses. In her brief, Harding fails to cite to the testimony of either of
defendant's experts. (Aplt. Br. pp. 29-49.) Instead, Harding recites her own trial
testimony and portions of the trial testimony of Dr. Bell and her subsequent treating
physician, Dr. Smith, that arguably support her position. (Aplt. Br. pp. 31-33, 39-44.)
Harding did not even request transcription of the trial testimony of Dr. Ganellen, one of
Dr. BelPs expert witnesses on the issues of negligence and causation. (R. at 503-504.)
Nor did she have transcribed the testimony of plaintiffs expert witnesses, Dr. Daniel L.
Icenogle and Dr. Bertram P. Rosenthal, both of whom testified favorably for the defense
on cross-examination. (See R. at 499-500, 923.) The testimony of Dr. Ganellen,
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Dr. Icenogle and Dr. Rosenthal is accordingly not even part of the record on appeal.
Harding cannot be said to have fulfilled her marshaling burden when omitting the trial
testimony of one of Dr. Bell's chief expert witnesses and the testimony of plaintiffs experts
favorable to the defense.
B.

THE JURY VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE,

Even if Harding had satisfied her burden to marshal the evidence, the jury verdict is
nevertheless beyond reproach because it is supported by substantial evidence. It is well
established in Utah jurisprudence that "the jury serves as the exclusive judge of both the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given particular evidence." State v.
Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993).
The jury found that Harding was more at fault in failing to seek prompt medical
treatment for her symptoms than was Dr. Bell in failing to diagnose unstable angina. The
evidence regarding whether Dr. Bell's care met the medical standard of care is accordingly
as relevant to the "insufficiency of evidence" argument as the evidence of Harding's
negligence. In her appellate brief, Harding has failed to marshal evidence on both issues.
There is substantial evidence sufficient both to exonerate Dr. Bell and implicate Harding.
At trial, Dr. Bell had two expert witnesses testify that Dr. Bell complied in every respect
with the standard of care: Kim Bateman, M.D., a family practitioner, and Edward
Ganellen, M.D., a board-certified cardiologist. (R. at 1416 pp. 11-12, 20-21, 23-25.)4

4

As stated above, Dr. Ganellen's trial testimony is not part of the record and
accordingly cannot be cited to. Citation can only be made to Dr. Bateman's testimony
and Harding's medical records. Some of Dr. Ganellen's testimony was summarized by
defense counsel in closing argument. (R. at 1412 pp. 8-9.)
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There is also ample evidence of Harding's comparative fault. The evidence is that
on January 24 and 25, 1997, two days before Harding suffered a heart attack which she
claims Dr. Bell should have prevented, Harding had recurrent chest pain, accompanied
with incidents of malaise, tiredness and exertional discomfort. (R. at 1415 pp. 67-68; R.
at 1422 Def.'s Ex. A. p. 114). Harding did not go to an emergency room or seek medical
care on either of those two days. (R. at 1416 pp. 26-27). She did not seek medical
treatment during two days of chest pain and other ominous symptoms, despite the facts
that: she had a family history of heart disease, with her father having had bypass heart
surgery four times and who died of a heart disease at age 48; she had a 30-plus year
history of smoking; she had a history of high blood pressure; she was being treated by Dr.
Bell to determine the cause of her January 4, 1997, chest and arm pain; and, she had been
referred to and had an appointment with a cardiologist, Dr. Asay, to rule out coronary
artery disease. (R. at 1414 pp. 66-67, 75-78, 121; R. at 1415 pp. 67-68; R. at 1422
Def.'s Ex. A. pp. 17, 114.) Dr. Bateman and Dr. Ganellen testified at trial that had
Harding sought medical attention on January 24th or 25th, Harding would have been
admitted to the hospital and treated, preventing her January 26th heart attack. (R. at 1416
pp. 26-27, 64.)
This evidence is more than sufficient to support the jury verdict allocating 45
percent of fault to Dr. Bell and 55 percent of fault to Harding. This verdict is well within
the range of possible findings based upon the evidence presented, especially when viewed
in the light most favorable to Dr. Bell. This court must accordingly defer to the jury's
assessment of liability.
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C.

FACTS REGARDING HARDING'S CONDUCT PRIOR TO
JANUARY 13, 1997, PROVIDES NO BASIS TO OVERTURN THE
JURY VERDICT FOR INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.

Rather than satisfy her burden to marshal the evidence, Harding makes the
convoluted argument that the jury verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence because
the jury should not have been allowed "to consider any factor for either negligence or
causation which preexisted the January 13, 1997, visit to Dr. Bell," Le^, Harding's history
of smoking and her failure to go to a doctor right away on January 4, 1997, after the
truck stop incident. (Aplt. Br. p. 35.) According to Harding, her conduct prior to
January 13, 1997, could not be a contributing factor in causing her injury and thus this
evidence should not have been admitted and considered by the jury and, without this
evidence, the jury could not have found any comparative negligence by Harding. (Aplt.
Br. pp. 33-38.)5
Substantively, this is a challenge to the jury verdict based on the admission of
evidence for consideration by the jury, not for insufficiency of the evidence. The record
demonstrates Harding did not object to, and the trial court did not rule upon, the
admissibility of evidence of facts existing prior to January 13, 1997. Indeed, it was
Harding that introduced evidence of Harding's smoking, (R. at 1414 pp. 66-67), and her
failure to see a doctor promptly after the January 4th truck stop episode. (R. at 1414 pp.
5

Harding's contention that the jury would have returned a verdict in her favor had
the jury not been allowed to consider evidence of Harding's conduct prior to January 13,
1997, is pure speculation. It is not known how the jury calculated its apportionment of
liability or what evidentiary components it considered in making this determination.
Based solely on the evidence of Harding's conduct after January 13, 1997, the jury could
easily have found Harding 55 percent negligent, given Harding's failure to seek medical
attention after suffering two days of chest pain on January 24 and 25, 1997. See
Discussion at Point II. C.
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75, 77)

Harding has not properly preserved this issue for appellate review and has

waived this contention absent plain error,6 which Harding has neither argued nor
demonstrated. State v. Schreuden 726 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Utah 1986); Utah R. Evid.
103(a). For this reason alone, this court should decline to address Harding's contention
regarding the admission of evidence of facts existing prior to January 13, 1997.
Even if it were proper to entertain Harding's claim in this regard, it would
nevertheless be unavailing. Evidence of Harding's smoking and other risk factors predating January 13, 1997, was not introduced for the purpose of establishing comparative
fault: This evidence was presented for the purpose of establishing damages and relevant
medical issues. Harding claims that Dr. Bell failed to diagnose her CAD, causing her to
suffer a preventable heart attack on January 26, 1997, which Harding claimed puts her at
risk for a future heart attack and a shortened life span. (R. at 6 & 960.) Dr. Smith,
Dr. Ganellen and Dr. Rosenthal each testified at trial that it is Harding's CAD which puts
her at increased risk for future heart attacks and a shortened life span, not her January 26th
heart attack. (R. at 923; R. at 1415 pp. 43, 60-61; See R. at 1412 p. 17.) Dr. Smith
testified that "the fact she smoked significantly increased her likelihood of developing
coronary artery disease." (R. 1415 p. 43.) Dr. Ganellen further testified that Harding
6

Harding's representation that cc[p]laintiff made early objections to the
consideration of Geri Harding's pre-existing conditions," (Aplt. Br. p. 36), is simply not
true. The only portion of the record to which Harding cites in support of this assertion is
her trial brief and the trial court's memorandum of the daily proceedings. (See Aplt. Br.
pp. 10 & 26; R. at 952-53 & 1048.) This is insufficient. Rule 7 requires Harding to
make application to the Court for exclusion of evidence, stating "with particularity the
grounds therefor." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1). A careful review of the record demonstrates
Harding failed to do this. She made no objection to the trial court at the time the evidence
was presented and, accordingly, deprived the trial court of an opportunity to rule on any
such objection.
20

suffered the January 26th heart attack because of CAD attributable to her 30-plus year
smoking habit, not because she did not see a cardiologist sooner. (See R. at 924; R. at
1412 p. 17.)
Evidence that Harding waited nine days after she experienced chest and arm pain at
the truck stop on January 4, 1997, before seeking medical treatment on January 13, 1997,
was not admitted as evidence of Harding's comparative fault. Rather, it was admitted as
relevant to medical issues relating to her diagnosis of CAD. Dr. Bateman and
Dr. Ganellen testified that the fact Harding had no recurrence of symptoms during the
nine days after the truck stop incident, removed her from the diagnosis of ccunstable
angina," making the diagnosis of CAD more difficult. (R. At 1416 pp. 18, 20, 21, 26,
29, 57-61; see R. at 1412 p. 8).
CONCLUSION
There is no basis to overturn the jury verdict in this case and it must be affirmed.
The evidence in the record is that Harding received a fair trial from a non-biased and
impartial jury, and the jury verdict is supported by substantial evidence. Harding's claims
to the contrary are neither supported in fact or law and must be disregarded for what they
are: an attempt to conjure up error where there is none.
DATED this *3{ day of October, 2001.
WILLIAMS & HUNT
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verdict form. Martineau v. Anderson, 636 P.2d
1039 (Utah 1981).
In general.
To preserve a question for appeal, an objection must be clear and concise and made in a
fashion calculated to obtain a ruling thereon.
Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456 (Utah Ct. App.
-mom
4. J • J onnnoj HAC/TU u innm
1989), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).
Instructions.
—Right to object.
The parties have a right to make objections to
the instructions to preserve challenges to their

Rule 47

accuracy; if counsel was prevented from making objections to instructions, he should, under
this rule, be deemed to have done so. Hanks v.
Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564 (1960).
Harmless error
, instructions" are correct anv error
/? , t h e m s t ™ c t l 0 n s * * « ™ . any error
which prevents
counsel from making objections
,,
.r .
,
,
* J,
thereto is harmless error. Hanks v.
Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8,354 P2d 564 (1960).
Cited in Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455
(Utah 1981); Broberg v. Hess, 782 R2d 198
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
If

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate
Review § 614.
C.J.S. — 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 202 et
seq.

A.L.R. — Sufficiency in federal court of motion in limine to preserve for appeal objection to
evidence absent contemporary objection at
trial, 76 A.L.R. Fed. 619.

Rule 47. Jurors.
(a) Examination of jurors. The court may permit the parties or their
attorneys to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself
conduct the examination. In the latter event, the court shall permit the parties
or their attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as is
material and proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such
additional questions of the parties or their attorneys as is material and proper.
(b) Alternate jurors. The court may direct that one or two jurors in addition
to the regular panel be called and impaneled to sit as alternate jurors.
Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who,
prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or
disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the
same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same
examination and challenges, shall take the same oath, and shall have the same
functions, powers, facilities, and privileges as the principal jurors. An alternate
juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged after the jury
retires to consider its verdict. If one or two alternate jurors are called each
party is entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition to those otherwise
allowed. The additional peremptory challenge may be used only against an
alternate juror, and the other peremptory challenges allowed by law shall not
be used against the alternates.
(c) Challenge defined; by whom made. A challenge is an objection made to
the trial jurors and may be directed (1) to the panel or (2) to an individual juror.
Either party may challenge the jurors, but where there are several parties on
either side, they must join in a challenge before it can be made.
(d) Challenge to panel; time and manner of taking; proceedings. A challenge
to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from the forms
prescribed in respect to the drawing and return of the jury, or on the
intentional omission of the proper officer to summon one or more of the jurors
drawn. It must be taken before a juror is sworn. It must be in writing or be
stated on the record, and must specifically set forth the facts constituting the
ground of challenge. If the challenge is allowed, the court must discharge the
jury so far as the trial in question is concerned.
(e) Challenges to individual jurors; number of peremptory challenges. The
challenges to individual jurors are either peremptory or for cause. Each party
shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges, except as provided under
Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule.
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(f) Challenges for cause; how tried. Challenges for cause may be taken on
ne or more of the following grounds:
(1) A want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law to render a person
ampetent as a juror.
(2) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to either party, or to
n officer of a corporation that is a party
(3) Standing in the relation of debtor and creditor, guardian and ward,
laster and servant, employer and employee or principal and agent, to either
arty, or united in business with either party, or being on any bond or
bligation for either party; provided, that the relationship of debtor and
reditor shall be deemed not to exist between a municipality and a resident
hereof indebted to such municipality by reason of a tax, license fee, or service
harge for water, power, light or other services rendered to such resident.
(4) Having served as a juror, or having been a witness, on a previous trial
between the same parties for the same cause of action, or being then a witness
herein.
(5) Pecuniary interest on the part of the juror in the result of the action, or
a the main question involved in the action, except his interest as a member or
itizen of a municipal corporation.
(6) That a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to the
:ause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging; but no
>erson shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed or expressed
m opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, founded upon
mblic rumor, statements in public journals or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror can and will, notwithstanding such
>pinion, act impartially and fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him.
Any challenge for cause shall be tried by the court. The juror challenged, and
my other person, may be examined as a witness on the trial of such challenge.
(g) Selection of jury. The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number ofjurors
Aiat are to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for all
3eremptory challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause sustained,
mother juror shall be called to fill the vacancy before further challenges are
nade, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause. When the
challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors
remaining, in the order called, and each side, beginning with the plaintiff, shall
indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn
until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then
call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to
constitute the jury, in the order in which they appear on the list, and the
persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury.
(h) Oath of jury. As soon as the jury is completed an oath must be
administered to the jurors, in substance, that they and each of them will well
and truly try the matter in issue between the parties, and a true verdict
rendered according to the evidence and the instructions of the court.
(i) Proceedings when juror discharged. If, after the jury is impaneled and
before verdict, a juror becomes unable or disqualified to perform his duty and
there is no alternate juror, the parties may agree to proceed with the other
jurors, or to swear a new juror and commence the trial anew. If the parties do
not so agree the court shall discharge the jury and the case shall be tried with
a new jury.
(j) View by jury. When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to
have a view of the property which is the subject of litigation, or of the place in
which any material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body
under the charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by
some person appointed by the court for that purpose. While the jury are thus
absent no person other than the person so appointed shall speak to them on
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(k) Separation of jury. If the jurors are permitted to separate, either during
the trial or after the case is submitted to them, they shall be admonished by the
court that it is their duty not to converse with, or suffer themselves to be
addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their
duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally
submitted to them.
(1) Deliberation ofjury. When the case is finally submitted to the jury they
may decide in court or retire for deliberation. If they retire they must be kept
together in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree
upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Unless
by order of the court, the officer having them under his charge must not suffer
any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask
them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he must not, before the
verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their deliberations
or the verdict agreed upon.
(m) Papers taken by jury. Upon retiring for deliberation the jury may take
with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits and all papers which
have been received as evidence in the cause, except depositions or copies of
such papers as ought not, in the opinion of the court, to be taken from the
person having them in possession; and they may also take with them notes of
the testimony or other proceedings on the trial taken by themselves or any of
them, but none taken by any other person.
(n) Additional instructions ofjury. After the jury have retired for deliberation, if there is a disagreement among them as to any part of the testimony, or
if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they may
require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon their being brought into
court the information required must be given in the presence of, or after notice
to, the parties or counsel. Such information must be given in writing or stated
on the record.
(o) New trial when no verdict given. If a jury is discharged or prevented from
giving a verdict for any reason, the action shall be tried anew.
(p) Court deemed in session pending verdict; verdict may be sealed. While
the jury is absent the court may be adjourned from time to time in respect to
other business, but it shall be open for every purpose connected with the cause
submitted to the jury, until a verdict is rendered or the jury discharged. The
court may direct the jury to bring in a sealed verdict at the opening of the court,
in case of an agreement during a recess or adjournment for the day.
(q) Declaration of verdict. When the jury or three-fourths of them, or such
other number as may have been agreed upon by the parties pursuant to Rule
48, have agreed upon a verdict they must be conducted into court, their names
called by the clerk, and the verdict rendered by their foreman; the verdict must
be in writing, signed by the foreman, and must be read by the clerk to the jury,
and the inquiry made whether it is their verdict. Either party may require the
jury to be polled, which shall be done by the court or clerk asking each juror if
it is his verdict. If, upon such inquiry or polling there is an insufficient number
of jurors agreeing therewith, the jury must be sent out again; otherwise the
verdict is complete and the jury shall be discharged from the cause.
(r) Correction of verdict. If the verdict rendered is informal or insufficient, it
may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be
sent out again.
(Amended effective January 1, 1998.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective January 1, 1998, substituted
"stated on the record" for "noted by the reporter" in the second sentence of Subdivision (d)
and for "taken down by the reporter" at the end
of Subdivision (n) and made stylistic changes.

rule is similar to Rule 47(a), F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Jurors generally,
§ 78-46-1 et seq.
Three-fourths of jurors may find verdict in
civil case, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 10.
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